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|Author by||: Joseph Stiglitz|
|Editor||: Penguin Press|
"Designed to bring Europe closer together, the euro has actually done the opposite- after nearly a decade without growth, unity has been replaced with dissent and enlargements with prospective exits. Joseph Stiglitz argues that Europe's stagnation and bleak outlook are a direct result of the fundamental flaws inherent in the euro project - economic integration outpacing political integration with a structure that actively promotes divergence rather than convergence. Money relentlessly leaves the weaker member states and goes to the strong, with debt accumulating in a few ill-favoured countries. The question now is- can the euro be saved? Laying bare the European Central Bank's misguided inflation-only mandate and explaining why austerity has condemned Europe to unending stagnation, Stiglitz outlines three possible ways forward- fundamental reforms in the structure of the Eurozone and the policies imposed on the member countries suffering the most; a well-managed end to the euro; or a bold, new system he dubs the 'flexible euro;. This important book, by one of the world's leading economists, addresses the euro-crisis on a bigger intellectual scale than any predecessor."
|Author by||: Joseph E. Stiglitz|
|Editor||: Allen Lane|
"Solidarity and prosperity fostered by economic integration- this principle has underpinned the European project from the start, and the establishment of a common currency was supposed to be its most audacious and tangible achievement. Since 2008, however, the European Union has ricocheted between stagnation and crisis. The inability of the eurozone to match the recovery in the USA and UK has exposed its governing structures, institutions and policies as dysfunctional and called into question the viability of a common currency shared by such different economies as Germany and Greece. Designed to bring the European Union closer together, the euro has actually done the opposite- after nearly a decade without growth, unity has been replaced with dissent and enlargements with prospective exits. Joseph Stiglitz argues that Europe's stagnation and bleak outlook are a direct result of the fundamental flaws inherent in the euro project - economic integration outpacing political integration with a structure that promotes divergence rather than convergence. Money relentlessly leaves the weaker member states and goes to the strong, with debt accumulating in a few ill-favoured countries. The question then is- Can the euro be saved? Laying bare the European Central Bank's misguided inflation-only mandate and explaining why austerity has condemned Europe to unending stagnation, Stiglitz outlines the fundamental reforms necessary to the structure of the eurozone and the policies imposed on the member countries suffering the most. But the same lack of sufficient political solidarity that led to the creation of a flawed euro twenty years ago suggests that these reforms are unlikely to be adopted. Hoping to avoid the huge costs associated with current policies, Stiglitz proposes two other alternatives- a well-managed end to the common currency; or a bold, new system dubbed 'the flexible euro.' This important book, by one of the world's leading economists, addresses the euro-crisis on a bigger intellectual scale than any predecessor. "
|Author by||: Enrico Marelli,Marcello Signorelli|
This book offers a fresh perspective on the recent Eurozone "double crisis" and its related economic policies. The authors present empirical evidence which sheds new light on the growing economic and political debate on the future of the Euro, the Eurozone and the EU. The book investigates and assesses the impact of the crisis with particular reference to monetary and fiscal policy, whose protracted austerity approach has dampened economic growth. In their discussion of the long-run European integration process, the authors emphasize the original weaknesses in the construction of the European Monetary Union and examine its failure to respond to the recent crisis. The concluding chapter focuses on the need for crucial reform in European governance and discusses the impact of the UK’s recent EU membership referendum. Scholars, students and members of the general public with an interest in the future of the Eurozone will find this work thought-provoking, instructive and highly informative.
|Author by||: David Marsh|
|Editor||: Yale University Press|
This book is the first comprehensive political and economic account of the birth and development of the Euro. Today the Euro is the supranational currency for sixteen European countries and the world's second-largest reserve currency. David Marsh tells the story of the rivalries, intrigues, and deal making that brought about a currency for Europe, and he analyzes the achievements and shortcomings of its first decade of existence. While the Euro represents a remarkable triumph of political will, great pressures are building on the single currency. Drawing on more than 100 interviews with leading figures associated with the Euro, and scores of secret documents from international archives, Marsh underscores the Euro's importance for the global economy, in particular for U.S. and British economic and political agendas. Hidden facts and fresh insights from The Euro --How the legacy of France and Germany's tortuous relations affects the Euro--Why the United Kingdom is unlikely to accept the Euro before 2025--The impact on the Euro of the U.S. credit crisis--How the Euro has rebounded against the aspirations of its founders--How Italy and Spain have massively lost competitiveness--Why radical changes must be adopted to prevent a European upheaval
|Author by||: International Monetary Fund|
|Editor||: International Monetary Fund|
This paper examines monetary and exchange rate policies of the euro area. The paper reviews the European Central Bank’s definition of price stability, and examines the factors determining “the optimal rate of inflation” in the euro area. It reviews the benefits of price stability, including the reduction in the distortions of savings and investment behavior that stem from the interaction between nominal tax systems and inflation. It then goes on to evaluate arguments for maintaining a small positive inflation rate in the context of the euro area.
|Author by||: Michael Carlberg|
|Editor||: Springer Science & Business Media|
This book studies the interactions between monetary and fiscal poUcies in the euro area. It carefully discusses the process of policy competition and the structure of policy cooperation. As to policy competition, the focus is on competition between the European central bank, the American central bank, the German government, and the French government. As to policy cooperation, the focus is on the same institutions. These are higher-dimensional issues. The pohcy targets are price stability and full employment. The policy makers follow co- turkey or gradualist strategies. The policy decisions are taken sequentially or simultaneously. Monetary and fiscal policies have spillover effects. Special features of this book are numerical simulations of policy competition and numerical solutions to policy cooperation. The present book is part of a larger research project on European Monetary Union, see the references at the back of the book. Some parts of this project were presented at the World Congress of the International Economic Association. Other parts were presented at the International Conference on Macroeconomic Analysis, at the International Institute of Public Finance, at the Macro Study Group of the German Economic Association, at the Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association, at the Gottingen Workshop on International Economics, at the Halle Workshop on Monetary Economics, at the Research Seminar on Macroeconomics in Freiburg, and at the Passau Workshop on International Economics.
|Author by||: Stefan Kawalec,Ernest Pytlarczyk,Kamil Kami ński|
This book presents a new narrative on the eurozone crisis. It argues that the common currency has the potential to kill the European Union, and the conventional wisdom that the eurozone can be fixed by a common budget and further political integration is incorrect. The authors address key questions such as why the European Union and the single market have been successful, why the common currency poses a threat to European integration, and whether it is possible to either fix the eurozone or dissolve it while keeping the EU and the single market. Contrary to the view that it would be best if the Southern European countries left the eurozone first, the book makes the case that the optimal solution would be to start the process with the most competitive countries exiting first. The authors argue that a return to national currencies would be beneficial not only to the crisis-ridden southern countries, but also to France and Germany, which were the main promoters of the single currency. An organised unwinding of the euro area would be beneficial both for the European economy and for Europe’s main trading partners. The authors contend that to defend the euro at all costs weakens the European economy and threatens the cohesion of the European Union. If pro-European and pro-market EU leaders do not dismantle the eurozone, it will most likely be done by their anti-European and anti-market successors. If that happens, the European Union and the common market will be destroyed. This book will be a useful and engaging contribution to the existing literature in the fields of macro, monetary and international finance and economics.
|Author by||: Markus K. Brunnermeier,Harold James,Jean-Pierre Landau|
|Editor||: Princeton University Press|
Why is Europe’s great monetary endeavor, the Euro, in trouble? A string of economic difficulties in Eurozone nations has left observers wondering whether the currency union can survive. In this book, Markus Brunnermeier, Harold James, and Jean-Pierre Landau argue that the core problem with the Euro lies in the philosophical differences between the founding countries of the Eurozone, particularly Germany and France. But the authors also show how these seemingly incompatible differences can be reconciled to ensure Europe’s survival. Weaving together economic analysis and historical reflection, The Euro and the Battle of Ideas provides a forensic investigation and a road map for Europe’s future.
|Author by||: Andrew Pettegree|
A series of linked studies of European print culture of the sixteenth century, focusing particularly on France and the regional, provincial experience of print.
|Author by||: Philippe De Lombaerde|
This book analyzes the monetary and exchange rate policies in Eastern European countries not covered by the current EU enlargement process. Specifically the book examines the major CIS countries: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and the Ukraine. (The new Eastern European EU members are also frequently referenced for comparison purposes.) Current and prospective monetary policy options are considered and the applicability of the EU monetary integration experience for the CIS countries and the prospects of a monetary re-unification around the Russian Federation are assessed. This is the first book to formally deal with many of these questions.
|Author by||: Anna Visvizi,Anna Matysek-Jędrych,Katarzyna Mroczek-Dąbrowska|
By all accounts, the case of Poland and its segue to market economy and democracy is a success story: 30 years of uninterrupted growth and development, infrastructure expansion, and modernization of the economy and society. Epochal changes have unfolded in a timespan of merely three decades. Change has taken place so fast that children born in late 1980s and onwards cannot remember what life in Poland under communism was like and cannot relate to it. Also, many elderly people, easy victims of romanticizing their own youth, tend to forget. As a result, the uniqueness of Polish transition and transformation, the boldness and efficiency of reforms, and the success that Polish society mastered together, tend to be undermined today both domestically and internationally. Poland has now been a member of the EU for more than 15 years. During that time, Poland’s image on the EU scene evolved from newcomer, through ‘model child’, champion of growth, to – in some respects – a maverick. This volume’s objective is to remind society, old and young, researchers, scholars and practitioners, that Poland’s success is an outcome of well-thought out and bold structural reforms implemented in a swift and timely manner, of society’s support for these reforms, and of third actors’ benign assistance. Looking back on the 30 years since the collapse of communism, and at the over 15 years of EU membership, this book offers an interdisciplinary, comprehensive and critical insight into factors and processes that have led to today’s Poland.
|Author by||: Hans-Werner Sinn|
|Editor||: OUP Oxford|
This book offers a critical assessment of the history of the euro, its crisis, and the rescue measures taken by the European Central Bank and the community of states. The euro induced huge capital flows from the northern to the southern countries of the Eurozone that triggered an inflationary credit bubble in the latter, deprived them of their competitiveness, and made them vulnerable to the financial crisis that spilled over from the US in 2007 and 2008. As private capital shied away from the southern countries, the ECB helped out by providing credit from the local money-printing presses. The ECB became heavily exposed to investment risks in the process, and subsequently had to be bailed out by intergovernmental rescue operations that provided replacement credit for the ECB credit, which itself had replaced the dwindling private credit. The interventions stretched the legal structures stipulated by the Maastricht Treaty which, in the absence of a European federal state, had granted the ECB a very limited mandate. These interventions created a path dependency that effectively made parliaments vicarious agents of the ECB's Governing Council. This book describes what the author considers to be a dangerous political process that undermines both the market economy and democracy, without solving southern Europe's competitiveness problem. It argues that the Eurozone has to rethink its rules of conduct by limiting the role of the ECB, exiting the regime of soft budget constraints and writing off public and bank debt to help the crisis countries breathe again. At the same time, the Eurosystem should become more flexible by offering its members the option of exiting and re-entering the euro - something between the dollar and the Bretton Woods system - until it eventually turns into a federation with a strong political power centre and a uniform currency like the dollar.
|Author by||: Mark Baimbridge,Brian Burkitt,Philip Whyman|
To date, critical analysis of the EMU project has largely been advanced from the centre-right spectrum of British politics. Comparable questions from the centre-left have failed to find a coherent voice. Although, the European fault-line cannot be characterized as a neat Left-Right issue there are noticeable divisions in opinion across British business, the trade union movement and within the Labour Party. Offering a unique insight into this key debate from the ‘centre-left’, eurosceptic view point, this book provides a rigorous analysis of all the salient economic and political issues of concern, such as: * the economics of a single currency * employment and social implications * sovereignty * political determination. The arguments presented in this volume highlight the emergence of a coherent alternative to deepening economic integration as a platform to build a just and equitable society. Contributions are drawn from leading academics, trade union leaders and prominent politicians, both from the Labour Party and the wider progressive Left in British politics. This informative and thought provoking book will be indispensable reading for students and practitioners in economics, politics and international relations, as well as those interested in this highly contentious topic.
|Author by||: Panicos Demetriades|
This book tells the story of the euro crisis in Cyprus from the inside. Written by the former Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus, Panicos Demetriades, who was in office during this turbulent period, this book shows how the crisis unravelled through a series of key events that occurred during his tenure. Written in chronological order, and broadly based on the author’s personal diary, starting from his first day in office, this volume brings together economics, banking, regulation, governance, history, politics and international relations. Presenting personal witness statements, including records of noteworthy telephone conversations, informal meetings and other milestones, it examines crucial questions like: How did Cyprus become so systemically important to the rest of the euro area? Why was Cyprus treated so differently in comparison to other peripheral countries in Europe? Why were bank depositors targeted? What role did Cyprus’ links with Russia play in the design of the programme? What has been the toxic fallout from the bail-in? Are there any longer-term implications for the euro? What are the lessons for regulators around the world? The book will appeal to readers interested in financial crises, the euro’s architecture, the evolution of the European Monetary Union, and those with an interest in how Europe and the IMF dealt with crises in peripheral European countries.
|Author by||: Erik Kwakkel,Rodney Thomson|
|Editor||: Cambridge University Press|
The first comprehensive study of the European book in the historical period known as the 'long twelfth century' (1075-1225).
|Author by||: Ashoka Mody|
|Editor||: Oxford University Press|
The promise of the European pursuit of ever closer union created tremendous optimism that conflict was the past and harmony would be the future. The enthusiasm for economic integration and monetary union, through the Euro, enhanced the confidence that differences among countries could beovercome.In this dynamic and incisive overview of the European project from its beginnings, Ashoka Mody convincingly demonstrates that the tensions and flaws of the European project were both baked-in and foreseen from the beginning. He focuses on personalities whose ambitious and relentless push forintegration led them to choose facts and analysis consistent with their visions and to dismiss warnings of turbulence. They thus laid the seeds for disappointment. Mody examines key moments when contradictions were papered-over, compromising the integrity of integration. He shows how political andeconomic leaders believed the stories they told themselves about the inevitability of a united Europe as a foundation of peace, prosperity, and democratic ideals, even in the face of warnings from the earliest stages that while the political pillars seemed strong, the economic foundations were weak.Mody compellingly shows how monetary union impaired European integration rather than enhanced it. European countries have always had vastly different economic conditions, and the common currency increased divergences rather than smoothing them, as many analysts warned at the time. The economic,financial, and political pathologies of the euro were there from the beginning, even if the global economic boom hid them. With political and economic elites benefitting, they could ignore the growing discontent of those who suffered and the antipathy to the European project in national heartlands.When crisis inevitably hit, leaders denied, delayed, and took half-measures that only further alienated people. If once the inability to deliver on the economic promise caused the political handicaps to worsen, now the political splintering is making it harder to mount an effective response.
|Author by||: Johan Van Overtveldt|
|Editor||: Agate Publishing|
Johan Van Overtveldt provides comprehensive documentation showing that the political dithering so apparent in the most recent euro crisis has in fact been the hallmark of the euro project from the start. --Anil Kashyap, Edward Eagle Brown Professor of Economics and Finance, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business From noted economic journalist Johan Van Overtveldt, an up-to-the-minute examination of the fate of the Euro. In a process that began with the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 and concluded on January 1, 1999, 11 Western European countries made the euro the European Union's single currency, and the European Central Bank (ECB) the EU's only policy-making central bank. Bringing together Germany, France, Italy, and other European countries into a monetary union with a single currency and a single monetary policy could only ever result in major imbalances between the member countries, thus threatening the EU itself. This was recognized from the start by many economists and other observers, and the political elite paid elaborate lip service to these warnings. However, no one really followed up on these risks in terms of actions and reforms. Instead, the politicians seemed to indicate, directly and indirectly, that if the EU showed unity, the conditions to turn itself into a well-functioning monetary union would simply come about automatically. Moreover, given the imperative to work together more closely, the monetary-union effort would strengthen the political union among the euro-countries. Thus, in spirit, the process of monetary union was often seen as a means to an end. With that reasoning, the political elite supervising monetary union turned a great idea--the creation of a unified currency for Europe--into a huge gamble. Implicit in their reasoning was the idea that Europe's leading politicians would always be able to come up with an adequate solution to any crisis that might occur. As the former Belgian prime minister and European Union leader Jean-Luc Dehaene repeated relentlessly: "The idea of a unified Europe grows and becomes reality through crises. We need crises to make progress." Dehaene and like-minded European politicians never seriously considered the possibility of an insoluble, catastrophic crisis that could potentially crash the entire EU effort. For ten years, from 1999 to 2008, it seemed that the politicians' claim was vindicated. Although there was little substantial progress toward real political union within the euro area, the euro and the euro countries in general prospered, despite a string of major shocks like the bursting of the dotcom bubble, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But things changed dramatically with the financial crisis of 2007-2008. In January 2009 Barry Eichengreen, professor of economics and political science at Berkeley, wrote that "what started as the Subprime Crisis in 2007 and morphed in the Global Credit Crisis in 2008 has become the Euro Crisis in 2009." After its immediate impact, the crisis caused the financial and capital markets to worry about the so-called sovereign risks, i.e. countries running the risk of becoming insolvent. Although budget deficits in countries like the United States and the United Kingdom were much larger than the aggregate data for the euro area, markets started to home in on the risks posed by countries inside the European monetary union. Markets recognized that the enormous problem facing everyone in the union was the long-term working of the monetary union itself. Eichengreen's "Euro Crisis" is all about the sustainability of EMU and the single currency. By early 2009 the structural imbalances within the euro area and especially the untenable situations building up in Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland were there for everybody to see. The first reaction of the political leadership was denial of any structural problem whatsoever. The second reaction was recognition of the crisis situation, but absolute denial of any link between that crisis and the workings of the monetary union. Eventually, a third phase set in: the search for external villains to blame. Those villains were found in the greed, speculation, and irresponsibility of the financial markets. As the French saying goes: "les excuses sont fait pour s'en server" ("excuses are made to take advantage of"). Fundamentally, however, the gigantic problems facing the EMU, and the euro as a currency, have little to do with either alleged criminal behavior in the financial markets or with the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The crisis of 2009-2010 was an accident waiting to happen. It could have happened earlier, or the clash could have been postponed for several more years; but given the the basic characteristics of the EMU-set-up, a major crisis was simply unavoidable. Untenable imbalances within the monetary union were enshrined in the different treaties, pacts, and political agreements that led to the creation of the euro in the first place, and guided its first ten years. That politicians never acted on this reality to make them the prime culprits of the long and highly painful death agony of the euro. The structure of this book is as follows: Chapter I gives an overview of the birth of the euro. Understanding this history is essential to understand the anomalies built into the project from the beginning. These anomalies form the subject of Chapter II, along with an analysis of how they led to the situation that turned Greece, Portugal, and Spain into euro-destroying economic disaster areas. Chapter III shows how this was not an unforeseeable situation, as Europe's history is filled with earlier failed attempts to build monetary unions. Chapter IV is focused on Germany, by far the most important country within EMU, and why the chances of Germany leaving the union are much higher than is generally assumed. The book concludes with an analysis of what lies in wait for the remains of the monetary union--and for a deeply divided and troubled continent in general. Either the EMU transforms itself fundamentally or it disintegrates, and the likeliest outcome is the latter.
|Author by||: Claudia Sternberg,Kira Gartzou-Katsouyanni,Kalypso Nicolaidis|
This book focuses on one of the most highly charged relationships of the Euro crisis, that between Greece and Germany, from 2009 to 2015. It explores the many ways in which Greeks and Germans represented and often insulted one another in the media, how their self-understanding shifted in the process, and how this in turn affected their respective appraisal of the EU and that which divides us or keeps us together as Europeans. These stories illustrate the book’s broader argument about mutual recognition, an idea and norm at the very heart of the European project. The book is constructed around a normative pivot. On one hand, the authors suggest that the tumultuous affair between the two peoples can be read as “mutual recognition lost” through a thousand cuts. On the other, they argue that the relationship has only bent rather than broken down, opening the potential for a renewed promise of mutual recognition and an ethos of “fair play” that may even re-source the EU as a whole. The book’s engaging story and original argument may appeal not only to experts of European politics and democracy, but also to interested or emotionally invested citizens, of whatever nationality.